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Abstract
We make two main contributions to the theory of economic and social net-
work formation. First, we introduce the notion of a network formation network
or a supernetwork. Supernetworks provide a framework in which we can formally
define and analyze farsightedness in network formation. Second, we introduce
a new notion of equilibrium corresponding to farsightedness. In particular, we
introduce the notion of a farsightedly basic network, as well as the notion of a
farsighted basis, and we show that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis.
A farsightedly basic network contained in the farsighted basis of a given super-
network represents a possible final resting point (or absorbing state) of a network
formation process in which agents behave farsightedly. Given the supernetwork
representation of the rules governing network formation and the preferences of
the individuals, a farsighted basis contains networks which are likely to emerge
and persist if individuals behave farsightedly.
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1 Introduction
Overview
Since the seminal paper by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) there has been a rapidly
growing literature on social and economic networks and their stability and eﬃciency
properties (e.g., see Jackson (2001) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001)). As
noted by Jackson (2001), an important issue that has not yet been addressed in the
literature on networks and network formation is the issue of farsighted stability (see
Jackson (2001), p.21 and p.35)). This issue is the focus of our paper. We make two
main contributions to the theory of economic and social network formation. First, we
introduce the notion of a network formation network. We call such a network a su-
pernetwork. Supernetworks provide a framework in which we can define a farsighted
dominance relation over networks, and thus a framework in which we can formally
analyze farsightedness in network formation. Second, we introduce a new notion of
equilibrium corresponding to our supernetwork formalization of farsightedness. In
particular, we introduce the notion of a farsightedly basic network, as well as the
notion of a farsighted basis, and we show that all supernetworks possess a farsighted
basis. A farsightedly basic network contained in the farsighted basis of a given su-
pernetwork represents a possible final resting point (or absorbing state) of a network
formation process in which agents behave farsightedly. Thus, given the supernetwork
representation of the rules governing network formation and the preferences of the in-
dividuals, a farsighted basis contains networks which are likely to emerge and persist
if individuals behave farsightedly.
A key ingredient in establishing that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis
is the notion of an inductive supernetwork . A supernetwork is said to be inductive if
given any farsighted domination path through the supernetwork there exists a net-
work (i.e., a node in the supernetwork) which is reachable via a farsighted domination
path from every network on the given path.1 We show that all supernetworks are
inductive. Then, by a straightforward application of a classical result due to Berge
(1958), we are able to conclude that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis. For-
mally, a set of networks is said to be a farsighted basis for the supernetwork, if given
any two distinct networks in the basis there exists no finite farsighted domination
path connecting the two networks and if for any network not contained in the basis,
there exists a finite farsighted domination path from this network to some network
contained in the basis. Thus, a farsighted basis is simply a von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set with respect to the relation defined via the farsighted domination paths on
the set networks composing the nodes of the supernetwork.2
We also show that given any supernetwork, any farsighted basis is a subset of the
largest consistent set of networks. Consistency with respect to farsighted dominance
and the notion of a largest consistent set were introduced by Chwe (1994) in an
abstract game setting. Here we extend the notion of farsighted consistency and the
1A farsighted domination path is a sequence of networks, {Gk}k, forming a path through the
supernetwork such for all k, network Gk farsightedly dominates network Gk−1.
2Put diﬀerently, a farsighted basis is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set with respect to the
transitive closure of the farsighted dominance relation.
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largest consistent set to network formation. Given agent preferences and the rules
governing network formation, as represented via the supernetwork, a network is said
to be farsightedly consistent if no agent or coalition of agents is willing to alter the
network (via the addition, subtraction, or replacement of arcs) for fear that such
an alteration might induce further network alterations by other agents or coalitions
that in the end leave the initially deviating agent or coalition no better oﬀ - and
possibly worse oﬀ. Our notion of a farsighted basis represents a refinement of our
network rendition of the largest consistent set. Moreover, our result establishing
that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis, together with our result showing
that any farsighted basis is a subset of the largest consistent set, imply that for any
supernetwork the largest consistent set of networks is nonempty.
In order to illustrate the utility of our framework, we apply our supernetwork
framework to a three-agent version of the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) and we compute the largest consistent set for two diﬀerent supernetworks cor-
responding to the collection of directed co-author networks.3 Jackson and Wolinsky
show that, in general, a pairwise stable co-author network can be partitioned into
fully intraconnected components, each of which has a diﬀerent number of members
(see Proposition 4, part (ii) in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).4 In our example, a sim-
ilar conclusion can be drawn: each farsightedly consistent network in each of the two
co-author supernetworks can be partitioned into fully intraconnected components,
each of which has a diﬀerent number of members. Also, in both of our examples,
each farsightedly consistent co-author network is Nash as well as Pareto optimal.
Directed Networks vs Linking Networks
We focus on directed networks, and in fact, we extend the definition of directed
networks found in the literature. In a directed network, each arc possesses an ori-
entation or direction: arc j connecting nodes i and i must either go from node i to
node i or must go from node i to node i.5 In an undirected (or linking) network, arc
j would have no orientation and would simply indicate a connection or link between
nodes i and i. Under our extended definition of directed networks, nodes are allowed
to be connected by multiple arcs. For example, nodes i and i might be connected by
arcs j and j, with arc j running from node i to i and arc j running in the opposite
direction (i.e., from node i to node i).6 Thus, if node i represents a seller and node i
a buyer, then arc j might represent a contract oﬀer by the seller to the buyer, while
arc j

might represent the acceptance or rejection of that contract oﬀer. Also, under
our extended definition loops are allowed and arcs are allowed to be used multiple
3 It would have been preferable to have included a larger number of agents in our example. How-
ever, moving beyond three agents, the number of co-author networks in the supernetwork increases
dramatically, making the computation very diﬃcult. The computation of a farsighted basis remains
an open question.
4A network is pairwise stable if for each pair of agents directly connected via an arc in the network
both agents weakly prefer to remain directly connected, and if for each pair of agents not directly
connected, a direct connection preferred by one of the agents makes the other agent strictly worse
oﬀ (i.e., if one agent prefers to be directly connected, the other does not).
5We denote arc j going from node i to node i via the ordered pair (j, (i, i)), where (i, i) is also
an ordered pair. Alternatively, if arc j goes from node i to node i, we write (j, (i, i)).
6Under our extended definition, arc j might also run in the same direction as arc j.
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times in a given network.7 For example, arc j might be used to connect nodes i and
i as well as nodes i and i. However, we do not allow arc j to go from node i to
node i multiple times in the same direction. By allowing arcs to possess direction
and be used multiple times and by allowing nodes to be connected by multiple arcs,
our extended definition makes possible the application of networks to a richer set
of economic environments. Until now, most of the economic literature on networks
has focused on linking networks (see for example, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)).
Given a particular directed network, an agent or a coalition of agents can change
the network to another network by simply adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs from
the existing network in accordance with certain rules represented via the supernet-
work.8 For example, if the nodes in a network represent agents, then the rule for
adding an arc j from node i to node i might require that both agents i and i agree
to add arc j. Whereas the rule for subtracting arc j, from node i to node i, might
require that only agent i or agent i agree to dissolve arc j. This particular set of
rules has been used, for example, by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Other rules are
possible. For example, the addition of an arc might require that a simple majority
of the agents agree to the addition, while the removal an arc might require that a
two-thirds majority agree to the removal. Given the flexibility of the supernetwork
framework, any set rules governing network formation can be represented.
Other Approaches and Related Literature
While the literature on stability in networks is well established and growing (e.g.,
see Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Jackson (2001), and Jackson and van den Nouwe-
land (2001)), the literature on farsighted stability in network formation is in its in-
fancy. As far as we know, the work by Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001) is the first to
formally addresses the issue of farsighted stability in network formation. Since Page,
Wooders, and Kamat (2001), other papers have appeared focusing on non-myopic be-
havior in network formation. Most notable are the papers by Watts (2002), Deroian
(2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2003). These papers diﬀer from our paper in at
least two respects: (1) all three papers analyze the non-myopic formation of linking
networks (rather than directed networks) and assume that network formation takes
place one link at a time in accordance with a given set of rules usually requiring link
addition to be bilateral while allowing link subtraction to be unilateral (thus, in all
three of these papers a particular set of network formation rules is assumed); (2) all
three papers utilize a notion of farsightedness and farsighted dominance that diﬀers
from the notion we use. For example, Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2002) oﬀer a prelimi-
nary model of dynamic network formation which attempts to capture farsightedness
by being dynamic and forward looking in the sense of dynamic programming. Their
work is closely related to the work of Konishi and Ray (2002) on dynamic coalition
formation. Our approach, while not explicitly dynamic, can be thought of as a dy-
namic network formation thought experiment, carried out at a particular point in
7A loop is an arc going from a given node to that same node. For example, given arc j and node
i, the ordered pair (j, (i, i)) is a loop.
8Put diﬀerently, agents can change one network to another network by adding, subtracting, or
replacing ordered pairs, (j, (i, i)), in accordance with certain rules.
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time, in which the future network consequences of individual or coalitional defections
from the status quo network are fully taken into account.9 Unlike Watts (2002),
Deroian (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2003), in our network formation model
we use Chwe’s (1994) notion of farsighted dominance (i.e., in our thought experi-
ment, a move from network G to network G might occur if network G farsightedly
dominates network G in the sense of Chwe). In a given supernetwork, network G (a
node in the supernetwork) farsightedly dominates network G (another node in the
supernetwork) if there exists a finite path through the supernetwork going from G
to G such that each consecutive move along the path (from one network to another)
can be brought about by some coalition and for each such coalition the network G
eventually reached by the path is preferred to the intermediate network altered by
that coalition. Thus, farsighted dominance allows for coalitional defections from a
given network which are not necessarily immediately preferred, but which eventually
lead to a network which is preferred (see Li (1992, 1993) for an alternative definition
of farsighted dominance requiring that each network along the path be preferred to
the previous network by the agent or coalition responsible for altering the previous
network). Chwe’s notion of farsighted dominance has two progenitors: the notion of
eﬀective preferences due to Guilbaud (1949) and the notion of indirect dominance
due to Harsanyi (1974).
Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the
work of Xue (1998, 2000), Luo (2001), Mariotti and Xue (2002), Bhattacharya and
Ziad (2003), and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2003) on farsightedness in games and
coalition formation. With the exception of Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2003), all
of these papers take as their starting point Greenberg’s Theory of Social Situations
(Greenberg (1990)). Here, we shall follow the approach introduced in Page, Wooders,
and Kamat (2001).
9Other important works on dynamic network formation which do not explicitly address the issue
of farsightedness are, for example, Watts (2001) and Jackson and Watts (2001).
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2 Directed Networks
We begin by giving a formal definition of the class of directed networks we shall
consider. Let N be a finite set of nodes, with typical element denoted by i, and let
A be a finite set of arcs, with typical element denoted by j. Arcs represent potential
connections between nodes, and depending on the application, nodes can represent
economic agents or economic objects such as markets or firms.10
Definition 1 (Directed Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, a directed network, G, is a subset of A× (N ×N).
We shall denote by N(N,A) the collection of all directed networks given N and A.
A directed network G ∈ N(N,A) specifies how the nodes in N are connected
via the arcs in A. Note that in a directed network order matters. In particular, if
(j, (i, i

)) ∈ G, this means that arc j goes from node i to node i . Also, note that
under our definition of a directed network, loops are allowed - that is, we allow an
arc to go from a given node back to that given node. Finally, note that under our
definition an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and multiple arcs can
go from one node to another. However, our definition does not allow an arc j to go
from a node i to a node i multiple times.
The following notation is useful in describing networks. Given directed network
G ⊆ A× (N ×N), let
G(j) :=
q
(i, i

) ∈ N ×N : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
,
G(i) :=
q
j ∈ A : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G or (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
G(i, i

) :=
q
j ∈ A : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
,
G(j, i) :=
q
i
 ∈ N : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
.



(1)
Thus,
G(j) is the set of node pairs connected by arc j in network G,
G(i) is the set of arcs going from node i or coming to node i in network G,
G(i, i

) is the set of arcs going from node i to node i in network G,
and
G(j, i) is the set of nodes which can be reached by arc j from node i in network G.
Note that if for some arc j ∈ A, G(j) is empty, then arc j is not used in network
G.Moreover, if for some node i ∈ N , G(i) is empty then node i is not used in network
G, and node i is said to be isolated relative to network G.
10Of course in a supernetwork, nodes represent networks.
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If in our definition of a directed network, we had required that G(j) be single-
valued and nonempty for all arcs j ∈ A, then our definition would have been the
same as that given by Rockafellar (1984).
Suppose that the node set N is given by N = {i1, i2, . . . , i5} , while the arc set A
is given by A = {j1, j2, . . . , j5, j6, j7} . Consider the network, G, depicted in Figure 1.
i
j1
j 2
j3
j4
j 5
1
i 2
i3
i4 i5
j6
Figure 1: Network G
In network G, G(j6) = {(i4, i4)} . Thus, (j6, (i4, i4)) ∈ G is a loop. Also, in network
G, arc j7 is not used. Thus, G(j7) = ∅.11 Finally, note that G(i4) = {j4, j5, j6}, while
G(i5) = ∅. Thus, node i5 is isolated relative to G.12
Consider the new network, G ∈ N(N,A) depicted in Figure 2.
i1
j1
i 2
i3
i4 i5j2
j 4
j5
j7
j6
j1
j3
Figure 2: Network G
In network G, G(j1) = {(i1, i2), (i3, i1)} . Thus, (j1, (i1, i2)) ∈ G and (j1, (i3, i1)) ∈
G. Note that in network G, node i5 is no longer isolated. In particular, G(i5) =
{j6, j7}. Also, note that nodes i2 and i4 are connected by two diﬀerent arcs pointed in
11The fact that arc j7 is not used in network G can also be denoted by writing
j7 /∈ projAG,
where projAG denotes the projection onto A of the subset
G ⊆ A× (N ×N)
representing the network.
12 If the loop (j7, (i5, i5)) were part of network G in Figure 1, then node i5 would no longer be
considered isolated under our definition. Moreover, we would have G(i5) = {j7}.
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opposite directions. Under our definition of a directed network it would be possible
to create a new network from network G by replacing arc j5 from i4 to i2 with arc
j4 from i4 to i2. However, it would not be possible under our definition to create a
new network by replacing arc j5 from i4 to i2 with arc j4 from i2 to i4 - because our
definition does not allow j4 to go from i2 to i4 multiple times. Finally, note that
nodes i1 and i3 are also connected by two diﬀerent arcs, but arcs pointed in the same
direction. In particular, G(i3, i1) = {j1, j3}.
Remark:
Under our extended definition of a directed network, a directed graph or digraph,
as it is sometimes called in the graph theory literature, can be viewed as a special
case of a directed network. A directed graph consists of a pair, (N,E), where N is a
nonempty set of nodes or vertices and E is a nonempty set of ordered pairs of nodes.
Given node set N , arc set A, and directed network G ∈ N(N,A), for each arc j ∈ A,
(N,G(j)) is a directed graph where, recall from expression (1) above, G(j) is the set
of ordered pairs of nodes connected by arc j, given by
G(j) :=
q
(i, i

) ∈ N ×N : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
.
Thus, a directed network is a collection of directed graphs where each directed graph
is labelled by a particular arc.
3 Supernetworks
Let D denote a nonempty set of agents (or economic decision making units) with
typical element denoted by d, and let Γ(D) denote the collection of all nonempty
subsets (or coalitions) of D with typical element denoted by S.
Given collection of directed networks G ⊆ N(N,A), we shall assume that each
agent’s preferences over networks in G are specified via a network payoﬀ function,
vd(·) : G→ R.
For each agent d ∈ D and each directed network G ∈ G, vd(G) is the payoﬀ to agent
d in network G. Agent d then prefers network G to network G if and only if
vd(G
) > vd(G).
Moreover, coalition S ∈ Γ(D) prefers network G to network G if and only if
vd(G
) > vd(G) for all d ∈ S.
Note that the payoﬀ function of an agent depends on the entire network. Thus, the
agent may be aﬀected by directed links between other agents even when he himself has
no direct or indirect connection with those agents. Intuitively, ‘widespread’ network
externalities are allowed.
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By viewing each network G in a given collection of directed networks G ⊆ N(N,A)
as a node in a larger network, we can give a precise network representation of the
rules governing network formation as well as agents’ preferences. To begin, let
M := {mS : S ∈ Γ(D)} denote the set of move arcs (or m-arcs for short),
P := {pS : S ∈ Γ(D)} denote the set of preference arcs (or p-arcs for short),
and
A :=M ∪ P.
Given networks G and G in G, we shall denote by
G G’
S’m
(i.e., by an m-arc, belonging to coalition S, going from node G to node G) the fact
that coalition S ∈ Γ(D) can change network G to network G by adding, subtracting,
or replacing arcs in network G. Moreover, we shall denote by
G G’
S’p
(i.e., by a p-arc, belonging to coalition S, going from node G to node G) the fact
that each agent in coalition S ∈ Γ(D) prefers network G to network G.
Definition 2 (Supernetworks)
Given directed networks G ⊆ N(N,A), agent payoﬀ functions {vd(·) : d ∈ D} , and
arc set A := M ∪ P, a supernetwork, G, is a subset of A× (G×G) such that for all
networks G and G in G and for every coalition S ∈ Γ(D),
(mS , (G,G
)) ∈ G if and only if coalition S can change network G to network G,
G 9= G, by adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in network G,
and
(pS , (G,G
)) ∈ G if and only if vd(G) > vd(G) for all d ∈ S.
Thus, a supernetwork G specifies how the networks in G are connected via coali-
tional moves and coalitional preferences - and thus provides a network representation
of agent preferences and the rules governing network formation. Given coalition
S ∈ Γ(D), m-arc mS ∈M, and p-arc pS ∈ P
(mS , (G,G
)) ∈ G is denoted by
G G’
S’m
while
(pS , (G,G
)) ∈ G is denoted by
G G’
S’p .
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Remarks:
(1) Under our definition of a supernetwork, m-arc loops and p-arc loops are ruled
out. Thus, for any network G and coalition S,
(mS , (G,G)) /∈ G and (pS , (G,G)) /∈ G.
While m-arc loops are ruled out by definition, the absence of p-arc loops in supernet-
works is due to the fact that each agent’s preferences over networks are irreflexive.
In particular, for each agent d ∈ D and each network G ∈ G, vd(G) > vd(G) is not
possible. Thus, (p{d}, (G,G)) /∈G.
(2) The definition of agent preferences via the network payoﬀ functions,
{vd(·) : d ∈ D} ,
also rules out the following types of p-arc connections:
G G’
S’p
S’p .
Thus, for all coalitions S ∈ Γ(D) and networks G and G contained in G,
if (pS , (G,G
)) ∈G, then (pS , (G, G)) /∈ G.
(3) For all coalitions S ∈ Γ(D) and networks G and G contained in G, if
(pS , (G,G
)) ∈ G, then
(pS, (G,G
)) ∈ G for all subcoalitions S of S.
(4) Under our definition of a supernetwork, multiple m-arcs, as well as multi-
ple p-arcs, connecting networks G and G in supernetwork G are allowed. Thus, in
supernetwork G the following types of m-arc and p-arc connections are possible:
For coalitions S and S, with S 9= S
G G’
S’m
Sm
,
and
G G’
S’p
Sp
.
However, multiplem-arcs, or multiple p-arcs, from network G ∈G to network G ∈ G
belonging to the same coalition are not allowed - and moreover, are unnecessary.
Allowing multiple arcs can be very useful in many applications. For example, multiple
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m-arcs (not belonging to the same coalition) connecting networks G and G in a given
supernetwork G denote the fact that in supernetwork G there is more than one way
to get from network G to network G - or put diﬀerently, there is more than one way
to change network G to network G.
(5) In many economic applications, the set of nodes, N , used in defining the
networks in the collection G, and the set of economic agents D are one and the same
(i.e., in many applications N = D).
4 Farsightedly Basic Networks
4.1 Farsighted Dominance
Given supernetwork G ⊂ A× (G×G), we say that network G ∈ G farsightedly
dominates network G ∈ G if there is a finite sequence of networks,
G0, G1, . . . ,Gh,
with G = G0, G = Gh, and Gk ∈ G for k = 0, 1, . . . , h, and a corresponding sequence
of coalitions,
S1, S2, . . . , Sh,
such that for k = 1, 2, . . . , h
(mSk , (Gk−1, Gk)) ∈ G,
and
(pSk , (Gk−1, Gh)) ∈ G.
We shall denote by G RR G the fact that network G ∈ G farsightedly dominates
network G ∈ G.
Figure 3 below provides a network representation of the farsighted dominance
relation in terms ofm-arcs and p-arcs. In Figure 3, networkG3 farsightedly dominates
network G0.
G3
G0 G1 G2
S1p
S1m S2m
S2p S3p S3m
Figure 3: G3farsightedly dominates G0
Note that what matters to the initially deviating coalition S1, as well as coalitions S2
and S3, is the ultimate network outcome G3. Thus, the initially deviating coalition
S1 will not be deterred even if
(pS1 , (G0, G1)) /∈ G
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as long as the ultimate network outcome G3 is preferred to G0, that is, as long as G3
is such that
(pS1 , (G0,G3)) ∈ G.
4.2 Farsighted Domination Paths and Inductive Supernetworks
Given supernetwork G ⊂ A× (G×G), we say that a sequence of networks {Gk}k in
G is a farsighted domination path, written RR-path, through supernetwork G if for
any two consecutive networks Gk−1 and Gk, Gk farsightedly dominates Gk−1, that
is, if
Gk−1 RR Gk.
We can think of the farsighted dominance relation Gk−1 RR Gk between networks Gk
and Gk−1 as defining a RR-arc from network Gk−1 to network Gk. Given RR-path
{Gh}h through G, the length of this path is defined to be the number of RR-arcs in
the path. We say that network G1 ∈ G is RR-reachable from network G0 ∈ G in G
if there exists a finite RR-path in G from G0 to G1 (i.e., a RR-path in G from G0 to
G1 of finite length). If network G0 ∈ G is RR-reachable from network G0 in G, then
we say that supernetwork G contains a RR-circuit. Thus, a RR-circuit in G starting
at network G0 ∈ G is a finite RR-path from G0 to G0. A RR-circuit of length 1 is
called a RR-loop. Note that because preferences are irreflexive, RR-loops are in fact
ruled out. However, because the farsighted dominance relation, RR, is not transitive,
it is possible to have RR-circuits of length greater than 1.
Given supernetwork G ⊂ A× (G×G), we can use the notion of RR-reachability
to define a new relation on the nodes of the supernetwork. We shall write
G1  G0 if and only if

G1 is RR -reachable from G0, or
G1 = G0.
(2)
The relation  is a weak ordering on the networks composing the nodes of the su-
pernetwork G. In particular,  is reflexive (G  G) and  is transitive (G2  G1
and G1  G0 implies that G2  G0). The relation  is sometimes referred to as the
transitive closure of the farsighted dominance relation, RR.
Definition 3 (RR-inductive Supernetworks)
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be a
supernetwork.
Supernetwork G is said to be RR-Inductive if given any RR-path, {Gk}k, through
G there exists a network G∗ ∈ G such that
G∗  Gk for all k.
Network G∗ above is referred to as the majorant of the sequence.
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Due to the finiteness of the node and arc sets, N and A, the collection of all
directed networks, N(N,A), is a finite set. The finiteness of N(N,A) implies that
all supernetworks defined over N(N,A) have a finite number of nodes, and this in
turn implies that all supernetworks are RR-Inductive. To see this, let {Gk}k be anyRR-path through G. If {Gk}k is finite, then the last network in the sequence is a
majorant. If {Gk}k is infinite, then because the supernetwork in finite, the sequence
contains at least one network which is repeated an infinite number of times, and this
infinitely repeated network is a majorant. We summarize these observation in the
following Theorem.
Theorem 1 (All supernetworks are RR-inductive)
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be
any supernetwork. Then G is RR-inductive.
4.3 Farsighted Bases
We begin with the definition.
Definition 4 (Farsighted Bases)
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be a
supernetwork.
A subset B of directed networks in G is said to be a farsighted basis for supernet-
work G if
(a) (internal  -stability) whenever G0 and G1 are in B, with G0 9= G1, then
neither G1  G0 nor G0  G1 hold, and
(b) (external  -stability) for any G0 /∈ B there exists G1 ∈ B
such that G1  G0.
In other words, a nonempty subset of networks B is a farsighted basis for supernet-
work G if G0 and G1 are in B, with G0 9= G1, then G1 is not reachable from G0, nor
is G0 reachable from G1, and if G0 /∈ B, then there exists G1 ∈ B reachable from G0.
Thus, a farsighted basis B for supernetworkG is simply a von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set with respect to the relation  determined by the supernetwork. Note that
if a supernetwork possesses a farsighted basis, then by definition it is nonempty.
Theorem 2 (Existence of a Farsighted Basis for any Inductive Supernetwork, Berge
(1958))
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be
any supernetwork. Then G possesses a farsighted basis.
Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 above and a classical
result due to Berge (1958) which, in our terminology, states that every inductive
supernetwork possesses a farsighted basis.
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5 Farsightedly Consistent Networks
In this section, we show that given any supernetwork, any farsighted basis is a subset
of the largest consistent set of networks.
5.1 The Largest Consistent Set of Networks
A subset of directed networks F is said to be farsightedly consistent if given any
networkG0 ∈ F and anymS1-deviation to networkG1 ∈G by coalition S1 (via adding,
subtracting, or replacing arcs in accordance with G), there exists further deviations
leading to some network G2 ∈ F where the initially deviating coalition S1 is not better
oﬀ - and possibly worse oﬀ. A network G ∈ G is said to be farsightedly consistent
if G ∈ F where F is a farsightedly consistent set corresponding to supernetwork G.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 5 (Farsightedly Consistent Sets)
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be a
supernetwork.
A subset F of directed networks in G is said to be farsightedly consistent in su-
pernetwork G if
for all G0 ∈ F,
(mS1 , (G0,G1)) ∈ G for some G1 ∈ G and some coalition S1, implies that
there exists G2 ∈ F
with G2 = G1 or G2 || G1 such that,
(pS1 , (G0,G2)) /∈ G.
There can be many farsightedly consistent sets. We shall denote by F∗ is largest
farsightedly consistent set (or simply, the largest consistent set). Thus, if F is a
farsightedly consistent set, then F ⊆ F∗.
Two questions arise in connection with the largest consistent set: (i) given super-
network G, does there exist a farsightedly consistent set of networks in G, and (ii)
is it nonempty? To establish existence, consider the mapping
ΛG(·) : 2G→2G,
where 2G denote the collection of all subsets of G (including the empty set). The
mapping ΛG(·) is defined as follows:
for subcollection of networks H ∈ 2G and network G0 ∈ G ,
G0 is contained in ΛG(H)
if and only if
∀ G1 ∈ G such that (mS, (G0,G1)) ∈ G for some coalition S ∈ Γ(D)
∃ a network G2 ∈ H such that
(i) G2 = G1 or G2 || G1, and
(ii) (pS, (G0,G2)) /∈ G, that is, vd(G2) ≤ vd(G0) for some d ∈ S.
(3)
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First, note that a set F is a farsightedly consistent set if and only if F is a fixed point
of the mapping ΛG(·). Second, note that ΛG(·) is monotone increasing; that is, for
any subcollections H and E of G,
H ⊆ E implie that ΛG(H) ⊆ ΛG(E).
To see that ΛG(·) has a unique, largest fixed point consider the following. Let
Σ =
q
H ∈ 2G : H ⊆ ΛG(H)
r
.
Note that Σ is nonempty since the empty subcollection ∅ ∈ 2G is contained in Σ; that
is, ∅ ⊆ ΛG(∅). Let F∗=
V
H∈ΣH. By the monotonicity of ΛG(·) and the definition of
Σ,
H ⊆ΛG(H) ⊆ ΛG(F∗) for all H ∈ Σ.
Hence
F∗=
^
H∈Σ
H ⊆
^
H∈Σ
ΛG(H) ⊆ ΛG(F∗).
Thus,
F∗ ⊆ ΛG(F∗).
Moreover, by the monotonicity of ΛG(·),
ΛG(F∗) ⊆ ΛG (ΛG(F∗)) .
Thus we have, ΛG(F∗) ∈ Σ and ΛG(F∗) ⊆ F∗, and we can conclude that
F∗ = ΛG(F∗).
The set F∗ is the largest farsightedly consistent set because if F is any other fixed
point (i.e., if F = ΛG(F)), then, F ∈ Σ and hence F ⊆ F∗.
The method of proving existence above is based on Chwe (1994) and is similar
to the method introduced by Roth (1975, 1977). The important point to take away
from the proof is that in order to show that the largest consistent set is nonempty, it
suﬃces to show that for some nonempty subset of networks H ∈ 2G,
H ⊆ΛG(H).
5.2 Farsighted Bases and Nonemptiness of the Largest Consistent
Set
We begin by defining a new relation on the collection of directed networks G ⊆
N(N,A). Let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be a supernetwork and let B be a farsighted basis
for G. Define the relation |B on the G as follows: for G1 and G0 in G,
G1 |B G0 if and only if

(a) G1 ∈ P||(G0), and
(b) B∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0),
(4)
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where
P||(G0) := {G ∈ G : G || G0} .
The new relation |B is quasi-transitive, that is, if G2 |B G1 and G1 |B G0, then
G2 ∈ B implies that G2 |B G0. To see this, first, note that G2 ∈ B∩ P||(G1), and
because G1 |B G0, B∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0). Thus, G2 ∈ P||(G0). Finally, note
that because G2 |B G1,
B∩P||(G2) ⊆ P||(G1),
and because G1 |B G0,
B∩P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0).
Thus, B∩P||(G2) ⊆ B∩P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0) and thus G2 |B G0.
Now let B∗ denote the basis with respect to the new relation |B.13 Such a basis
exists, by Berge (1958), because the supernetwork G is |B-inductive. In particular,
given the finiteness of G it is easy to show that given any |B-path, {Gk}k, through
G there exists a network G∗ ∈ G such that
G∗ B Gk for all k,
where
G1 B G0 if and only if

G1 is |B -reachable from G0, or
G1 = G0.
(5)
But now note that because the relation |B is quasi-transitive, B∗ is in fact a von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set with respect to the relation |B determined by su-
pernetwork G. Thus,
(a) B∗ is internally |B -stable; that is, G ∈ B∗ implies that B∗ ∩ P|B(G)= ∅,
and
(b) B∗ is externally |B -stable; that is, G /∈ E implie that B∗ ∩ P|B(G)9= ∅,
where
P|B(G) :=

G ∈ G : G |B G .
Moreover, by Theorem 4 in Berge (1958), B∗ is the unique |B-stable set.
We can now state our main result on the relationship between the farsighted basis
B (i.e., the basis with respect to ||), the basis B∗ with respect to |B, and the largest
consistent set F∗.
Theorem 3 (All Farsightedly Basic Networks Are Farsightedly Consistent)
Let G ⊆ N(N,A) be a collection of directed networks and let G ⊂ A× (G×G) be
a supernetwork. Let B be a farsighted basis for G and B∗ the corresponding unique
|B-stable set. The following statements are true:
1. B ⊆ B∗.
13The farsighted basis B can be referred to as the basis with respect to the farsighted dominance
relation || .
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2. The largest consistent set, F∗, is nonempty and B∗ ⊆ F∗.
3. The largest consistent set, F∗, is externally stable with respect to farsighted
dominance, that is, if network G is a node in supernetwork G not contained
F∗, then there exists a network G, a node in supernetwork G, contained in F∗
that farsightedly dominants G (i.e., G || G).
Proof. (1) B ⊆ B∗: Suppose network G0 is contained in B but not contained in B∗.
Since B∗ is |B-stable, G0 /∈ B∗ implies that there exists
G1 ∈ B∗ ∩ P|B(G0).
G1 ∈ P|B(G0) implies that G1 ∈ P||(G0) and B∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0). If G1 ∈ B
we have a contradiction of the internal -stability of B. If G1 /∈ B, then there
exists a RR-path through the supernetwork from G1 to some G2 ∈ B. But then
G1 ∈ P||(G0) together with this fact implies that there exists a RR-path through
the supernetwork from G0 ∈ B to G2 ∈ B, also a contradiction of the internal -
stability of B.
(2) To show that the largest consistent set, F∗, is nonempty and that B∗ ⊆ F∗, it
suﬃces to show that B∗ ⊆ ΛG(B∗): Suppose network G0 is contained in B∗ but not
contained in ΛG(B∗). G0 /∈ ΛG(B∗) implies that there exists a network G1 with
(mS1 , (G0, G1)) ∈ G for some coalition S1,
such that for all networks G2 ∈ B∗ with G2 = G1 or G2 ∈ P||(G1), G2 ∈ P||(G0).
It suﬃces to consider two cases:
Case 1: G1 ∈ B∗. If G1 ∈ B∗, then by the implications of G0 /∈ ΛG(B∗) stated
above, G1 ∈ P||(G0) and B∗∩P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0). But B⊆ B∗ and B∗∩P||(G1) ⊆
P||(G0) imply that B ∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0). Thus, G1 ∈ B∗, G1 ∈ P|B(G0), and
G0 ∈ B∗, a contradiction of the internal |B-stability of B∗.
Case 2: G1 /∈ B∗. If G1 /∈ B∗, then by the external |B-stability of B∗ there exists
G2 ∈ B∗ ∩ P|B(G1)
Thus, there exists G2 ∈ B∗ with G2 ∈ P||(G1) and B ∩ P||(G2) ⊆ P||(G1).
Because B ⊆ B∗
B ∩ P||(G2) = B∗ ∩ B ∩ P||(G2),
and because B ∩ P||(G2) ⊆ P||(G1)
B∗ ∩ B ∩ P||(G2) ⊆ B∗ ∩ P||(G1).
Therefore,
B ∩ P||(G2) ⊆ B∗ ∩ P||(G1).
Now recall that G0 /∈ ΛG(B∗) implies that
B∗ ∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0).
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Thus, we have G2 ∈ B∗ ∩ P||(G1) ⊆ P||(G0), and thus,
G2 ∈ P||(G0) and B ∩ P||(G2) ⊆ P||(G0),
implying that
G2 ∈ B∗ ∩ P|B(G0).
This fact together with G0 ∈ B∗ contradict the internal |B-stability of B∗.
(3) Since B∗ ⊆ F∗, G /∈ F∗ implies that G /∈ B∗. Since B∗ is |B-stable, there
exists a network G ∈ B∗, and hence a network G ∈ F∗ such that G |B G. Given
the definition of the relation |B, G || G.
By parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3, we have
B ⊆ B∗ ⊆ F∗.
Thus, any farsightedly basic network is farsightedly consistent.
6 An Example: The Jackson-Wolinsky Co-author Model
In this section, we compute the largest consistent sets and the Nash equilibria for
two supernetwork models of the Jackson and Wolinsky co-author problem. All of our
computations are carried out using a Mathematica package developed by Kamat and
Page (2001).
6.1 Co-author Networks
Consider a situation in which each of three researchers, i1, i2, and i3, is attempting
to decide with which other researchers to collaborate. Figure 4 is a directed network
representation of one possible configuration of research proposals and researcher col-
laborations.
i1
i 2 i3
j 1
j 3
j 1
j 2
j 1
j2 j 3j2
Figure 4: A Directed Co-author Network,
G32 in Table 1
In Figure 4, the loops, (j1, (i1, i1)), (j2, (i2, i2)), and (j3, (i3, i3)), at each of the nodes
indicates that each researcher has undertaken a project on his own. The j2 arc
from node i2 to i3 indicates that researcher i2 has proposed a research collaboration
to researcher i3, but since there is no reciprocating arc j3 from researcher i3 to
researcher i2 no research collaboration is undertaken. Note that researchers i1 and i2
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are connected by reciprocal arcs j1 and j2 indicating that a research collaboration has
been undertaken. Thus, the reciprocating arcs indicate that i1 and i2 are co-authors.
Note that i1 and i3 are also co-authors. Letting ni denote the number of arcs from
researcher i to any researcher i (including i = i) - and therefore letting ni denote the
total number of research projects and research proposals undertaken by researcher i
- we shall assume, as do Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), that the payoﬀ to researcher
i in any given co-author network is given by
%
1
ni
+
[
i=co−author

1
ni
+
1
ni
+
1
nini
&
− ci(ni − 1),
where ni − 1 is the total number of research proposals and research collaborations
and ci(ni − 1) is the direct costs of these proposals and collaborations.
Table 1 below, consisting of four panels, lists all possible co-author networks -
assuming each researcher undertakes a project on his own. Denote the collection of
all possible co-author networks by Gca.
(j3, (i3, i3))
(j2, (i2, i2))

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1))
 
(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i3))
 

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1)),
(j1, (i2, i3))


(j1, (i1, i1)) G1 G2 G3 G4
(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2))

G5 G6 G7 G8

(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

G9 G10 G11 G12


(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

 G13 G14 G15 G16

(j3, (i3, i3)),
(j3, (i3, i1))

(j2, (i2, i2))

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1))
 
(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i3))
 

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1)),
(j1, (i2, i3))


(j1, (i1, i1)) G17 G18 G19 G20
(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2))

G21 G22 G23 G24

(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

G25 G26 G27 G28


(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

 G29 G30 G31 G32
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
(j3, (i3, i3)),
(j3, (i3, i2))

(j2, (i2, i2))

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1))
 
(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i3))
 

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1)),
(j1, (i2, i3))


(j1, (i1, i1)) G33 G34 G35 G36
(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2))

G37 G38 G39 G40

(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

G41 G42 G43 G44


(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

 G45 G46 G47 G48


(j3, (i3, i3)),
(j3, (i3, i1)),
(j3, (i3, i2))


(j2, (i2, i2))

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1))
 
(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i3))
 

(j2, (i2, i2)),
(j2, (i2, i1)),
(j1, (i2, i3))


(j1, (i1, i1)) G49 G50 G51 G52
(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2))

G53 G54 G55 G56

(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

G57 G58 G59 G60


(j1, (i1, i1)),
(j1, (i1, i2)),
(j1, (i1, i3))

 G61 G62 G63 G64
Table 1: All Possible Co-author Networks, Gca
6.2 Co-author Network Payoﬀs and Preferences
We construct two possible supernetworks, Gca1and Gca2, over the collection Gca by
varying the payoﬀs to each researcher of proposing to or collaborating with other re-
searchers.14 In supernetworkGca1 we shall assume that the payoﬀs to each researcher
in any given co-author network G contained in the collection Gca are given by
vik(G) =

 1
nik
+
[
ik=co-author in G

1
nik
+
1
nik
+
1
niknik

− .3(nik − 1), (6)
where k = 1, 2, 3, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} , k 9= k. Table 2 below, consisting of four panels,
summarizes the payoﬀ possibilities in supernetwork Gca1. Each payoﬀ vector - a
14By varying the payoﬀs, we change the configuration of the preference arcs and therefore change
the supernetwork.
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3-tuple whose components give the payoﬀs to each researcher - are subscripted by
the identification number of the network generating the payoﬀ vector (see Table 1 for
networks and identification numbers).
(1, 1, 1)1 (1, .20, 1)2 (1, .20, 1)3 (1,−.27, 1)4
(.20, 1, 1)5 (1.45, 1.45, 1)6 (.20, .20, 1)7 (1.20, .73, 1)8
(.20, 1, 1)9 (.20, .20, 1)10 (.20, .20, 1)11 (.20,−.27, 1)12
(−.27, 1, 1)13 (.73, 1.20, 1)14 (−.27, .20, 1)15 (.51, .51, 1)16
(1, 1, .20)17 (1, .20, .20)18 (1, .20, .20)19 (1,−.27, .20)20
(.20, 1, .20)21 (1.45, 1.45, .20)22 (.20, .20, .20)23 (1.20, .73, .20)24
(1.45, 1, 1.45)25 (1.45, .20, 1.45)26 (1.45, .20, 1.45)27 (1.45,−.27, 1.45)28
(.73, 1, 1.20)29 (1.73, 1.20, 1.20)30 (.73, .20, 1.20)31 (1.51, .51, 1.20)32
(1, 1, .20)33 (1, .20, .20)34 (1, 1.45, 1.45)35 (1, .73, 1.20)36
(.20, 1, .20)37 (1.45, 1.45, .20)38 (.20, 1.45, .20)39 (1.20, 1.73, 1.20)40
(.20, 1, .20)41 (.20, .20, .20)42 (.20, 1.45, 1.45)43 (.20, .73, 1.20)44
(−.27, 1, .20)45 (.73, 1.20, .20)46 (−.27, 1.45, 1.45)47 (.51, 1.51, 1.20)48
(1, 1,−.27)49 (1, .20,−.27)50 (1, 1.20, .73)51 (1, .51, .51)52
(.20, 1,−.27)53 (1.45, 1.45,−.27)54 (.20, 1.20, .73)55 (1.20, 1.51, .51)56
(.20, 1, .73)57 (1.20, .20, .73)58 (1.20, 1.20, 1.73)59 (1.20, .51, 1.57)60
(.51, 1, .51)61 (1.51, 1.20, .51)62 (.51, 1.20, 1.51)63 (.51, .51, .51)64
Table 2: Network Payoﬀs in supernetwork Gca1
For example, in co-author network G32 in supernetwork Gca1, the payoﬀs to re-
searchers are given by
(vi1(G32), vi2(G32), vi3(G32)) = (1.51, .51, 1.20).
In network G32, researcher i2 is involved in his own project, is involved in one research
collaboration with researcher i1 (hence i2 and i1 are co-authors), and proposes a
collaboration to researcher i3 - but because the proposal is not reciprocated, no
collaboration between i2 and i3 occurs. Thus, ni2 = 3 (2 projects and 1 proposal).
Researcher i2’s co-author, i1, is involved in three research projects: one on his own,
one with researcher i1, and one with researcher i3 (hence ni1 = 3). Given payoﬀ
function (6), researcher i2’s payoﬀ is computed as follows:
vi2(G32) =
1
3
+

1
3
+
1
3
+
1
9

− .6 .= .51.
Here, .6 = 2 × .3 is the direct cost to agent i2 of his research activities. Thus, his
own project generates no direct cost, but does generate an indirect cost expressed as
reduction in the average amount of time that can be spent on any one project.
Table 3 below, also consisting of three panels, summarizes the payoﬀ possibilities
in supernetwork Gca2. In supernetwork Gca2, we assume that payoﬀs are given by
vik(G) =



k
1
nik
+
S
ik=co-author in G

1
nik
+ 1ni
k
+ 1niknik
l
− 1.2, if nik−1 = 2k
1
nik
+
S
ik=co-author in G

1
nik
+ 1ni
k
+ 1niknik
l
− .3, if nik−1 = 1.
(7)
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Thus, in supernetwork Gca2 the direct costs of research activities (proposals and
collaborations) are increasing.
(1, 1, 1)1 (1, .20, 1)2 (1, .20, 1)3 (1,−.87, 1)4
(.20, 1, 1)5 (1.45, 1.45, 1)6 (.20, .20, 1)7 (1.20, .13, 1)8
(.20, 1, 1)9 (.20, .20, 1)10 (.20, .20, 1)11 (.20,−.87, 1)12
(−.20, 1, 1)13 (.13, 1.20, 1)14 (−.87, .20, 1)15 (−.09,−.09, 1)16
(1, 1, .20)17 (1, .20, .20)18 (1, .20, .20)19 (1,−.87, .20)20
(.20, 1, .20)21 (1.45, 1.45, .20)22 (.20, .20, .20)23 (1.20, .13, .20)24
(1.45, 1, 1.45)25 (1.45, .20, 1.45)26 (1.45, .20, 1.45)27 (1.45,−.87, 1.45)28
(.13, 1, 1.20)29 (1.13, 1.20, 1.20)30 (.13, .20, 1.20)31 (.91,−.09, 1.20)32
(1, 1, .20)33 (1, .20, .20)34 (1, 1.45, 1.45)35 (1, .13, 1.20)36
(.20, 1, .20)37 (1.45, 1.45, .20)38 (.20, 1.45, .20)39 (1.20, 1.13, 1.20)40
(.20, 1, .20)41 (.20, .20, .20)42 (.20, 1.45, 1.45)43 (.20, .13, 1.20)44
(−.87, 1, .20)45 (.13, 1.20, .20)46 (−.87, 1.45, 1.45)47 (−.09, .91, 1.20)48
(1, 1,−.87)49 (1, .20,−.87)50 (1, 1.20, .13)51 (1,−.09,−.09)52
(.20, 1,−.87)53 (1.45, 1.45,−.87)54 (.20, 1.20, .13)55 (1.20, .91,−.09)56
(.20, 1, .13)57 (1.20, .20, .13)58 (1.20, 1.20, 1.13)59 (1.20,−.09, .91)60
(−.09, 1,−.09)61 (.91, 1.20,−.09)62 (−.09, 1.20, .91)63 (.69, .69, .69)64
Table 3: Network Payoﬀs in supernetwork Gca2
6.3 Computational Results
In Table 4 below we list the largest consistent sets corresponding to supernetworks
Gca1 and Gca2. We also list the Nash networks and the Pareto eﬃcient networks for
each of our supernetworks.
Gca1 Gca2
Largest Consistent Set F∗ {G6, G25, G35, G30, G40, G59} {G6, G25, G35}
Nash Networks {G1, G6,G25, G35, G30, G40, G59} {G1, G6, G25, G35}
Pareto Eﬃcient Networks {G6, G25, G35, G30, G40, G59} {G1, G6, G25, G35}
Table 4: Summary of Computational Results
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Figure 5 depicts the all co-author networks contained in Table 4.
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Figure 5: Farsightedly Consistent Networks Relative to Information Sharing Supernetwork GI
Note that in each supernetwork, the largest consistent set is a subset of the Nash
set. Also, note that in each supernetwork, the farsightedly consistent networks as
well as the Nash networks are such that all research proposals are reciprocated -
thus, in all the farsightedly consistent networks and Nash networks researchers either
collaborate or work alone. Finally, note that in supernetwork Gca2 where the costs of
research activities are increasing, the farsightedly consistent networks as well as the
Nash networks are such that no researcher is involved in more than 1 collaboration -
it is simply too costly.
We conclude the co-author example by considering the issue of Pareto eﬃciency.
Define the set of Pareto eﬃcient networks relative to the collection Gca as follows:

G ∈ Gca : there does not exist G such that vd(G) > vd(G) for all d ∈ D

.
By examination of the payoﬀs in Tables 2 and 3, we conclude that in both supernet-
works Gca1 and Gca2, the set of farsightedly consistent networks is contained in the
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set of Pareto eﬃcient networks. In fact, in supernetwork Gca1, the largest consistent
set equals the Pareto eﬃcient set. In supernetwork Gca2, only Pareto eﬃcient, Nash
network G1 is not contained in the largest consistent set. But note that G1 is weakly
Pareto dominated by each of the farsightedly consistent networks, G6, G25, and G35.
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